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Abstract
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-
games) where the graph does not necessarily a¤ect the productivity but can inuence the
way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage
values that are e¢ cient instead of values that are component e¢ cient. For CO-games with
connected graphs, e¢ ciency and component e¢ ciency coincide. In particular, the Myerson
value (Myerson, 1977) is e¢ cient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the
Myerson value. We identify the value that is e¢ cient for all CO-games, coincides with the
Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satises fairness.
Keywords: communication graph, fairness, e¢ ciency, e¢ cient extension, Shapley value,
Myerson value
2010 MSC: 91A12, JEL: C71, D60
1. Introduction
The players involved in a cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply TU-
game, only di¤er with respect to the worth that the coalitions they belong to can obtain
from cooperation. Nonetheless, an essential characteristic of many natural situations is
that the players organize themselves into some hierarchical, technical, or communicational
structure. It is therefore crucial to understand how the distribution of payo¤s among the
players can be a¤ected by their social organization. Myerson (1977) proposes to model the
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a¢ nities between the players by an undirected graph. The combination of a TU-game and
a graph is called a communication game, or simply CO-game, and a communication value,
henceforth CO-value, evaluates the payo¤ that each player can claim for his participation
in a CO-game.
Myerson (1977) assumes that a coalition is feasible if and only if its members are connec-
ted directly or indirectly through their links in the graph. Thus, the communication between
the players is necessary to enable their cooperation. This interpretation leads to CO-values
that are component e¢ cient, i.e., the worth of each component of the graph is distributed
among its members. The most prominent component e¢ cient CO-values probably is the
Myerson value (Myerson, 1977). The Myerson value can be characterized by component
e¢ ciency and fairness. Fairness states that adding a link to the graph changes the payo¤s
of the players forming this link by the same amount.
An alternative natural interpretation of the communication graph is that the players
use their social links in order to improve their bargaining position in the negotiation pro-
cess underlying a CO-game, as highlighted by Owen (1977) and Hart and Kurz (1983) in
the framework of TU-games with a coalition structure. Communication among players is
therefore not regarded to be necessary for establishing cooperation. As a consequence, this
interpretation supports CO-values that are e¢ cient, i.e., the worth of the grand coalition
is distributed among its members. E¢ cient CO-values have been introduced by Casajus
(2007) and more recently by Hamiache (2012), Béal et al. (2012), and van den Brink et al.
(2012).
In this article, further developments on the design of e¢ cient CO-values are investig-
ated. Our study is motivated by two facts. First, we feel that the fairness property also is
reasonable if a communication graph is mainly understood as a means of bargaining. This
is particularly desirable because this property conveys a natural principle of distributive
justice. Two players who establish a new channel for negotiations should equally benet.
Second, for CO-games with connected graphs, component e¢ ciency and e¢ ciency coincide.
Thus, even though the two interpretations of a communication graph are incompatible for
CO-games with unconnected graphs, they generally agree on the payo¤s for CO-games with
connected graphs.
A rst step towards the analysis of e¢ cient CO-values for CO-games is to consider
CO-values on CO-games with connected graphs and to look for their e¢ cient extensions
to the class of CO-games with arbitrary graphs. By an e¢ cient extension, we mean an
(a) e¢ cient CO-value that (b) coincides with the underlying CO-value on connected graphs,
and (c) satises the fairness property characterizing the underlying CO-value. Hence, we are
interested in the CO-values that are e¢ cient, coincide with the Myerson value for CO-games
with connected graphs, and satisfy fairness.
One may argue that the Myerson value is component e¢ cient by nature. However, we
support the argument that the Myerson value is an e¢ cient and fair CO-value for CO-games
with connected graphs by providing a new characterization of the Myerson value on this class
of CO-games that uses e¢ ciency instead of component e¢ ciency. Then, we turn to the only
e¢ cient and fair extension of the Myerson value that has been provided in the literature
(van den Brink et al., 2012). We prove its uniqueness as a consequence of the following
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more general result: There exists at most one extension of any fair and e¢ cient CO-value
for CO-games with connected graphs to the class of all CO-games. Based on these results,
we then present a new characterization of the CO-value introduced by van den Brink et al.
(2012).
It is worth to mention that our study exhibits some similarities with the literature on
TU-games with a coalition structure, in which two analogous conicting interpretations of
the coalition structure coexist. The Owen value (Owen, 1977) is e¢ cient while the value of
Aumann and Drèze (1974) is component e¢ cient, i.e., the worth of each component of the
coalition structure is distributed among its members. For an e¢ cient CO-value in the spirit
of the Owen value, the reader is referred to Casajus (2007).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives basic denitions and notations. The
(component-)fair and e¢ cient extensions of the Myerson value is studied in Section 3. Some
remarks conclude the paper.
2. Cooperative games and graphs
Fix an innite set U, the universe of players, and let N denote the set of non-empty and
nite subsets of U.
A TU-game is a pair (N; v) consisting of a set of players N 2 N and a coalition
function v 2 ff : 2N  ! R j f(;) = 0g, where 2N denotes the power set of N . Subsets
of N are called coalitions, and v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. For any TU-game
(N; v) and any S  N , the sub-game of (N; v) induced by S is denoted by (S; vjS), where
vjS is the restriction of v to 2S.
A value onN is an operator ' that assigns a payo¤vector '(N; v) 2 RN to any TU-game
(N; v). The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the value given by
SHi (N; v) =
X
SNnfig
1
jN j 
jN j   1
jSj
 1
 (v (S [ fig)  v (S))
for all TU-games (N; v), and i 2 N .
A communication graph for N 2 N is an undirected graph (N;L) ; L  LN :=
ffi; jg ji; j 2 N; i 6= jg ; a typical element (link) of L is written as ij := fi; jg. Players
i; j 2 N are called connected in (N;L) if there is a sequence of players (i1; i2; : : : ; ik), k 2 N;
k > 1 from N such that i1 = i, ik = j, and i`i`+1 2 L for all ` 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g : It is clear
that connectedness is an equivalence relation. Hence, it induces a partition C (N;L) of N ,
the set of components of (N;L) ; such that C 2 C (N;L), i; j 2 C; k 2 N nC; i 6= j implies
that i and j are connected and that i and k are not connected in (N;L) : The component of
(N;L) containing i 2 N is denoted by Ci (N;L) : The graph (N;L) is called connected if
C (N;L) = fNg.
A CO-game is a triple (N; v; L), where (N; v) is a TU-game and L  LN . We denote
by G the set of all such CO-games. A CO-game is called connected if the associated graph
is connected, and cycle-free is the associated graph is cycle-free. We denote by GC  G the
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class of all connected CO-games. A CO-value on some class of CO-games G  G is an
operator ' that assigns a payo¤ vector '(N; v; L) 2 RN to every CO-game (N; v; L) 2 G.
TheMyerson value (Myerson, 1977) is the CO-value on G given by
MY (N; v; L) := SH
 
N; vL

; vL (S) :=
X
T2C(S;LjS)
v (T ) ; S  N
It is characterized by component e¢ ciency and fairness. Throughout this article, we some-
times invoke axioms on di¤erent subclasses of CO-games indicated by jG, G  G in their
denition. For any such subclass, all the CO-games used in the axiom belong to the subclass.
Component e¢ ciency, CEjG. A value ' satises CEjG if for all (N; v; L) 2 G and
C 2 C(N;L), X
i2C
'i(N; v; L) = v(C):
Fairness, FjG. A value ' satises FjG if for all (N; v; L) 2 G, and ij 2 L such that
(N; v; L n fijg) 2 G,
'i (N; v; L)  'i (N; v; L n fijg) = 'j (N; v; L)  'j (N; v; L n fijg) :
Component e¢ ciency states that the worth of each component of the graph is distributed
among its members. Fairness requires that removing a link from the graph changes the
payo¤s of the players forming this link by the same amount.
Theorem 1. (Myerson, 1977) The Myerson value is the unique CO-value on G that satises
component e¢ ciency (CEjG) and fairness (FjG).
3. E¢ cient and fair extension of the Myerson value
For connected CO-games, the Myerson value is e¢ cient, i.e., it satises the following
property on GC :
E¢ ciency, EjG. A value ' satisesEjG if for all (N; v; L) 2 G, we have
P
i2N 'i (N; v; L) =
v (N) :
In this section, we explore the possibility of an e¢ cient extension of the Myerson value for
connected CO-games to the class of all CO-games. This extension shall be in the same
spirit as the Myerson value. Since the Myerson value is e¢ cient on the class of connected
CO-games, one possibly would like this CO-value to coincide with the Myerson value for
such games. Moreover, Myerson (1977) characterizes his CO-value via component e¢ ciency
and fairness, i.e., fairness can be considered to be the soul of his value. Thus, fairness seems
to be a desirable property for the e¢ cient version of the Myerson value.
In order to clarify that the Myerson value is an e¢ cient and fair CO-value for connected
CO-games, we invoke the following relative of fairness that has been suggested by Casajus
(2009).1
1Note that the original statement of this property as Weak fairness 2contains a typo.
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Connected fairness, CNFjG. A value ' satises CNFjG if for all (N; v; L) 2 GC \ G
and ij 2 L, we have
'i (N; v; L)  'i
 
Ci (N;L n fijg) ; vjCi(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCi(N;Lnfijg)

= 'j (N; v; L)  'j
 
Cj (N;L n fijg) ; vjCj(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCj(N;Lnfijg)

:
Similarly to fairness, connected fairness considers the change of the payo¤s of two players
i and j if the link ij is removed. Either the players remain in the same component and
connected fairness imposes the same condition as fairness. Or the players end up in di¤erent
components. In this case, connected fairness compares the original payo¤s with the payo¤s
obtained if the CO-game is restricted to each players component, respectively, and imposes
an equal change of the payo¤s. Note that all graphs involved in this axiom are connected.
We provide the following characterization of the Myerson value on the class of connected
CO-games.2
Theorem 2. A CO-value ' on GC satises e¢ ciency (EjGC) and connected fairness (CNFjGC)
if and only if ' = MY on GC.
Proof. By Theorem 1, the Myerson value on GC satises EjGC and FjGC . Concerning
CNFjGC , let (N; v; L) 2 GC and ij 2 L be as in the axiom. If removing ij does not split the
component, CNFjGC is implied by FjGC .
If removing ij splits the component, then
MYi (N; v; L) MYj (N; v; L)
=MYi (N; v; L n fijg) MYj (N; v; L n fijg)
=MYi
 
Ci (N;L n fijg) ; vjCi(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCi(N;Lnfijg)

 MYj
 
Cj (N;L n fijg) ; vjCj(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCj(N;Lnfijg)

:
where the rst equation follows from FjGC and the second equation drops from the fact that
MY satises component decomposability3 (van den Nouweland, 1993, pp. 28-29).
Hence, we only have to prove that at most one value satises these two axioms. By
contradiction, assume that two di¤erent CO-values ' and  on GC satisfy EjGC andCNFjGC .
Let N 2 N be such that ' (N 0; v; L) =  (N 0; v; L) for all (N 0; v; L) 2 GC with jN 0j < jN j.
Let L  LN be such that '  N; v; L0 =  (N; v; L0) for all (N; v; L0) 2 GC with L0 ( L: By
EjGC , it holds that jN j  2. Furthermore, L 6= ; since (N; v; L) 2 GC . For each ij 2 L,
2According to Theorem 2, there exists a redundancy in the similar but weaker result due to Casajus
(2009, Lemma 4.2).
3Component decomposability: For all (N; v; L) 2 G, C 2 C(N;L), and i 2 C such that (C; vjC ; LjC) 2
G, we have 'i (N; v; L) = 'i (C; vjC ; LjC).
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CNFjGC and the assumptions on N and L yield that
'i(N; v; L)  'j(N; v; L) = 'i
 
Ci (N;L n fijg) ; vjCi(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCi(N;Lnfijg)

 'j
 
Cj (N;L n fijg) ; vjCj(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCj(N;Lnfijg)

=  i
 
Ci (N;L n fijg) ; vjCi(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCi(N;Lnfijg)

  j
 
Cj (N;L n fijg) ; vjCj(N;Lnfijg); L n fijg jCj(N;Lnfijg)

=  i(N; v; L)   j(N; v; L);
i.e., 'i(N; v; L)    i(N; v; L) = 'j(N; v; L)    j(N; v; L): Since (N;L) is connected, there
is a chain of links connecting any k; ` 2 N: Hence, we have 'k(N; v; L)    k(N; v; L) =
'`(N; v; L)   `(N; v; L) =  for all k; ` 2 N and some  2 R: Now, EjGC implies  = 0, a
contradiction. 
Among the e¢ cient CO-values that coincide with the Myerson value on connected CO-
games and that have been discussed in the literature, only one CO-value satises fairness.
In the following, we call this value the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value, given by
EEMYi (N; v; L) := MYi (N; v; L) +
v (N)  vL(N)
jN j :
van den Brink et al. (2012) introduce and characterize the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson
value using the following axiom.
Fair distribution of surplus, FDSjG. A value ' satises FDSjG if for all (N; v; L) 2 G,
and C;C 0 2 C (N;L), we haveX
i2C
'i (N; v; L)  'i (C; vjC ; LjC)
jCj =
X
i2C0
'i (N; v; L)  'i (C 0; vjC0 ; LjC0)
jC 0j :
Fair distribution of surplus requires that the average change of the payo¤s of the players in
a component C 2 C (N;L) equals the average change of the players in any other component
C 0 2 C (N;L) if one compares the payo¤s in the restriction of the CO-game to the respective
component with the payo¤s of the original CO-game.
Theorem 3. (van den Brink et al., 2012) A CO-value ' on G satises e¢ ciency (EjG),
fairness (FjG), and fair distribution of surplus (FDSjG) if and only if ' = EEMY.
Since the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value coincides with the Myerson value for con-
nected CO-games, Theorem 3 implies that the restriction of the Myerson value to connected
CO-games has an e¢ cient and fair extension to the whole domain of CO-games. This trig-
gers the question on whether there exist other (possibly less egalitarian) e¢ cient and fair
extensions of the Myerson value from connected CO-games to the class of all CO-games.
Such extensions do not exist. This is a direct consequence of the next result, which shows
that for every fair and e¢ cient CO-value on the class of connected CO-games, there exists
at most one fair and e¢ cient extension to the class of all CO-games.4
4The proof of Theorem 4 indicates that it can be sharpened by just requiring ' (N; v; L) =  (N; v; L)
for all L  LN such that C  N;LN n L > 1: Note that C  N;LN n L > 1 entails jC (N;L)j = 1:
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Theorem 4. Let ' and  be two CO-values on G that satisfy e¢ ciency (EjG) and fairness
(FjG). If '(N; v; L) =  (N; v; L) for all (N; v; L) 2 GC, then ' =  for all (N; v; L) 2 G.
Proof. Let the CO-values ' and  be as in the theorem. Suppose ' 6=  and consider
any N 2 N such that '(N; v; L) 6=  (N; v; L) for some (N; v; L) 2 G. There is some
maximal L  LN and some i 2 N such that 'i(N; v; L) 6=  i(N; v; L). By assumption,
(N; v; L) 2 G n GC so that jC (N;L)j > 1: Let C := Ci (N;L) and choose any j 2 N n C. By
FjG and the maximality of L, we have
'i (N; v; L)  'k (N; v; L) = 'i (N; v; L [ fikg)  'k (N; v; L [ fikg)
=  i (N; v; L [ fikg)   k (N; v; L [ fikg)
=  i (N; v; L)   k (N; v; L)
for all k 2 N n C: Analogously, one shows
'j (N; v; L)  '` (N; v; L) =  j (N; v; L)   ` (N; v; L)
for all ` 2 C n fig : Hence, we have
'i (N; v; L)   i (N; v; L) = 'j (N; v; L)   j (N; v; L)
for all j 2 N: Summing up over j 2 N gives
jN j  ('i (N; v; L)   i (N; v; L)) =
X
j2N
'j (N; v; L) 
X
j2N
 j (N; v; L)
EjG
= 0;
i.e., 'i (N; v; L) =  i (N; v; L). Contradiction. 
Applying the previous Theorem 4 to the Myerson value immediately yields the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. The E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value EEMY is the unique e¢ cient and
fair extension of the Myerson value, i.e., ' satises ' = MY on GC and meets e¢ ciency
(EjG) and fairness (FjG), if and only if ' = EEMY on G.
Finally, we obtain a new characterization of the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value.
Theorem 6. The E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value EEMY is the unique CO-value on
G that satises e¢ ciency (EjG), fairness (FjG), and connected fairness (CNFjG).
Proof. Existence: By Theorem 3, EEMY satises EjG and FjG. From Theorem 2, it is
immediate that EEMY satises CNFjG. Uniqueness: Let ' satisfy EjG, FjG, and CNFjG.
By Theorem 2, ' = MY = EEMY on GC . Using Theorem 4, one obtains ' = EEMY on
G. 
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Remark 1. This characterization of the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value is non-redundant.
The null value Null given by Nulli (N; v; L) = 0 for all (N; v; L) 2 G and i 2 N satises
fairness and connected fairness but not e¢ ciency. The equal division solution ED given by
EDi (N; v; L) = v (N) = jN j for all (N; v; L) 2 G and i 2 N satises e¢ ciency and fairness
but not connected fairness. The CO-value '~ given by
'~i (N; v; L) = MYi (v) +
v (N)  vL (N)
jC(N;L)j  jCi (N;L)j
for all (N; v; L) 2 G and i 2 N satises e¢ ciency and connected component fairness but
not connected fairness. Note that the examples also show that fairness neither implies nor
is implied by connected fairness.
Remark 2. Among all the e¢ cient CO-values, the E¢ cient Egalitarian Myerson value is
the unique value that minimizes the euclidean distance to the Myerson value. More specic-
ally, it is straightforward to show that
EEMY(N; v; L) = argmin
x2RN :Pi2N xi=v(N)d (x;MY(N; v; L))
for all (N; v; L) 2 G; where d (x; y) := pPi2N(xi   yi)2 denotes the Euclidean distance
between x 2 RN and y 2 RN :5
4. Concluding remarks
We emphasize that the Myerson value is an e¢ cient CO-value for connected CO-games
by providing a characterization that employs e¢ ciency instead of component e¢ ciency, and
that works within the class of connected CO-games. Further, we consider fair and e¢ cient
extensions to the class of all CO-games. It turns out that only one such extension exists.
It assigns to every player an equal share of the surplus created between the components, 
v (N)  vL (N) = jN j, plus his payo¤ according to the Myerson value. We provide a char-
acterization of this CO-value that rests on fairness properties and on e¢ ciency.
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